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The social welfare provided by cooperation depends
on the enforcement of social norms. Determining
blameworthiness and assigning a deserved pun-
ishment are two cognitive cornerstones of norm
enforcement. Although prior work has implicated
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in norm-
based judgments, the relative contribution of this
region to blameworthiness and punishment deci-
sions remains poorly understood. Here, we used
repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS)
and fMRI to determine the specific role of DLPFC
function in norm-enforcement behavior. DLPFC
rTMS reduced punishment for wrongful acts without
affecting blameworthiness ratings, and fMRI re-
vealed punishment-selective DLPFC recruitment,
suggesting that these two facets of norm-based
decision making are neurobiologically dissociable.
Finally, we show that DLPFC rTMS affects punish-
ment decision making by altering the integration of
information about culpability and harm. Together,
these findings reveal a selective, causal role for
DLPFC in norm enforcement: representational inte-
gration of the distinct information streams used to
make punishment decisions.
INTRODUCTION
The success of our species rests in large measure on our unique
capacity for large-scale, stable cooperation among non-kin.
Though the origin of this ability is an area of active study and
debate, many attribute it to the development or elaboration ofNeucognitive capacities that permit us to establish social norms,
transmit them across generations, and detect and sanction their
violation (Bendor and Swistak, 2001; Chang and Sanfey, 2013;
Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2004;
Haushofer and Fehr, 2008; Henrich et al., 2006; Marlowe et al.,
2011; Montague and Lohrenz, 2007; Ruff et al., 2013; Sanfey
et al., 2014). Successful cooperation today is made possible
by systems of justice that inflict state-authorized costs on those
who would otherwise be gleeful defectors among naive or re-
signed cooperators. Indeed, regardless of the specific phylog-
eny of human ultra-sociality, the continued stability of modern
human societies hinges on our ability to enforce widely shared
sentiments about appropriate behavior (Buckholtz and Marois,
2012; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Marlowe et al., 2011).
Given the importance of norms for the development of modern
human culture, some have suggested that human brains are
especially well equipped tomake norm-based judgments (Buck-
holtz andMarois, 2012; Crockett, 2013; Fehr andCamerer, 2007;
Sanfey et al., 2014). Over the last decade, functional imaging and
brain stimulation work implicate one region in particular—the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; specifically, the anterior
aspect of brodmann area 46 sometimes referred to as rostro-
lateral PFC)—as being crucial for norm-enforcement. These
studies show evidence of DLPFC engagement across a variety
of tasks indexing moral decision making (Cushman et al.,
2012; Prehn et al., 2008; Tassy et al., 2012), second-party pun-
ishment (Knoch et al., 2006, 2010; Sanfey et al., 2003), third-
party punishment (Buckholtz et al., 2008; Schleim et al., 2011;
Strobel et al., 2011), and norm compliance (Baumgartner et al.,
2011; Chang et al., 2011; Ruff et al., 2013; Strobel et al., 2011).
Some have suggested that the involvement of DLPFC across
these tasks reflects cognitive control (Haushofer and Fehr,
2008; Knoch et al., 2006; Tassy et al., 2012), while others have
posited that the DLPFC is necessary to assign causal responsi-
bility to agents during norm-based judgments (Fugelsang and
Dunbar, 2005; Roser et al., 2005; Satpute et al., 2005).ron 87, 1369–1380, September 23, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1369
However, the complex nature of the norm-enforcement con-
struct itself makes it challenging to pin down the precise role
of DLPFC. Norm enforcement is not a single, unitary cognitive
process, but rather comprises a range of distinct subcomponent
processes. These include evaluating an agent’s action with
respect to shared codes for acceptable conduct (moral permis-
sibility); assessing the agent’s role in causing that act (causal
responsibility); determining the agent’s mental state during the
act—especially his intentions (moral responsibility or ‘‘blame-
worthiness’’); appraising the outcome of the act, particularly
whether and how much it harmed other people (harm assess-
ment); and, finally, arriving at an appropriate sanction for the
act (punishment) (Buckholtz and Marois, 2012; Cushman,
2008; Gray et al., 2012). The challenge inherent in parsing this
construct experimentally has made it difficult to selectively
map DLPFC to a specific cognitive subdomain within the larger
norm-enforcement construct.
Interestingly, the particular area of DLPFC engaged during
norm enforcement has also been consistently observed in a
range of non-social paradigms. Across the cognitive tasks in
which activation in this region has been reported—such as
working memory, analogical reasoning, and rule-based decision
making—the unifying feature appears to be a requirement to
integrate representations from multiple subtasks in order to
select responses that are adaptively matched to task goals
(Bunge et al., 2005b; Christoff et al., 2001; De Pisapia and
Braver, 2008; De Pisapia et al., 2007, 2012; Duncan, 2010;
Hampshire et al., 2011). Extending this conceptualization of
DLPFC to the domain of norm enforcement, we have recently
offered an integration-and-selection hypothesis for the role of
DLPFC in norm-based judgments (Buckholtz and Marois,
2012). According to this hypothesis, DLPFC is responsible for
integrating output representations from decision-relevant sub-
tasks during norm enforcement; this integrated signal is then
used to bias response selection toward the most contextually
appropriate action. For example, retributive punishment in legal
contexts requires the integration of at least two main streams of
information to arrive at a just sanction: (1) the severity of the
criminal offense (i.e., the harm it caused); and (2) the blame-
worthiness of the offender (i.e., his/her moral culpability, as
a function of his state of mind at the time of the offense) (Darley,
2009; LaFave, 2010). Punishment judgments are therefore
the final output of an integration process that jointly considers
information about the harm a defendant caused and informa-
tion about his/her perceived blameworthiness for having caused
it. DLPFC recruitment during decisions to punish culpable
agents for criminal violations (Buckholtz et al., 2008; Treadway
et al., 2014), its reported involvement in second-party economic
norm-enforcement paradigms (Knoch et al., 2006; Sanfey et al.,
2003), and its consistency across multiple classes of norms
(e.g., fairness and distributive norms, moral norms, and laws)
(Cushman et al., 2012; Schleim et al., 2011; Strobel et al.,
2011; Tassy et al., 2012) have led us to propose that DLPFC
acts as a superordinate processing node that receives and
integrates context-dependent ‘‘biasing’’ inputs during norm-
enforcement decisions. Based on prior work, we speculate
that these inputs arise from medial corticolimbic circuitry and
the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), encoding harm and blame-1370 Neuron 87, 1369–1380, September 23, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Incworthiness signals, respectively (Buckholtz et al., 2008; Li
et al., 2009; Yoder and Decety, 2014; Treadway et al., 2014).
According to this model, the output of this putative DLPFC inte-
gration process, reflecting an interaction between harm and
culpability (i.e., the degree of moral blameworthiness attending
to an agent’s actions), biases selection from among an array of
context-specific punishment response options (Buckholtz and
Marois, 2012).
This hypothesis makes several testable predictions. First,
DLPFC should be particularly sensitive to decisions that re-
quire joint consideration of moral responsibility and harm
severity, compared to decisions that rely only on one of
them. Specifically, we predict that the involvement of DLPFC
should be more evident when participants are asked to
determine an appropriate punishment for a norm violation
compared to when they are only instructed to rate an agent’s
moral responsibility (blameworthiness) for that norm violation.
This prediction is grounded in the fact that punishment deci-
sions require representational integration from (at least) two
processes (mental state evaluation and harm assessment),
while blameworthiness assessments primarily hinge on mental
state representations. Second, we predict that the involvement
of DLPFC should be more pronounced for punishment deci-
sions about blameworthy agents, compared to agents for
whom responsibility has been mitigated by an extenuating
circumstance. This the idea that supposition is predicated on
responsibility judgments precede and constrain harm-based
judgment (Buckholtz et al., 2008; Buckholtz and Marois,
2012; Treadway et al., 2014; but see Leslie et al., 2006). In
other words, once information that reduces or eliminates the
culpability of an agent is presented, information about harm
is largely irrelevant to punishment, alleviating the need to inte-
grate this information with intent representations in order to
make an appropriate judgment.
In the present study, we combine brain stimulation and neuro-
imaging to (1) identify a selective role for DLPFC in blamewor-
thiness versus punishment, and (2) test the integrative model
of DLPFC function in norm enforcement. To that end, we ex-
ploited the fact that punishment and blameworthiness judg-
ments have distinct information processing requirements; the
former requires a decision maker to integrate representational
outputs from mental state evaluation and harm severity assess-
ment, while the latter is simply the product of mental state eval-
uation. First, we used a between-groups, sham-controlled
repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) paradigm
targeting DLPFC in a sample of 66 healthy volunteers. In two
separate sessions, participants were asked to make punish-
ment and blameworthiness decisions for each of a series of hy-
pothetical textual scenarios in which a protagonist (‘‘John’’)
commits a crime. These scenarios varied both in the harm
caused by the criminal act and the protagonist’s culpability.
Harms ranged from simple theft to murder, while culpability var-
ied according to the protagonist’s mental state: in some trials
‘‘John’’ could be held fully responsible for his actions (R trials);
in other trials, duress, psychosis, or other mitigating circum-
stances resulted in Diminished Responsibility for his otherwise
criminal behavior (DR trials). The punishment task entailed
deciding how much punishment John deserved for his actions,.
Figure 1. HarmandCulpabilityAffectBlame-
worthiness and Punishment Decisions
(A and B) Mean ratings of Blameworthiness (A) and
Punishment (B) as a function of Harm severity (x
axis) and Culpability (colored lines).
(C and D) Mean ratings across all combinations of
Culpability and Harm, ordered from low Culpability/
low Harm (C) to full Culpability/high Harm (D). Error
bars indicate SEM.whereas the blameworthiness task asked how morally respon-
sible John was for his actions. We predicted that DLPFC TMS
would affect punishment—but not blameworthiness—decisions
and would do so by interfering with the appropriate integration
of harm and culpability signals during decision making. We
then used fMRI in a separate cohort of subjects to provide
multi-modal convergent evidence for the selective involvement
of DLPFC in punishment decision making. If the hypothesized
integration function of the DLPFC in punishment decision mak-
ing is correct, we would expect greater DLPFC activity when
participants make punishment decisions compared to blame-
worthiness judgments.
RESULTS
Culpability and Harm Severity Increase Punishment and
Blameworthiness Assignment
We first examined the impact of culpability and harm severity
on blameworthiness and punishment ratings within the entire
sample (i.e., collapsed across sham and active conditions) by
performing separate repeated-measures ANOVA (RM-ANOVA)
for each judgment type (Punishment and Blameworthiness),
with Culpability (R versus DR) and Harm Severity as within-sub-
ject factors (see Supplemental Information and Table S1 for
response time data). Harm Severity was dummy coded as an
ordinal variable according to scenario offense: 1 = Property
Crime (theft and property damage), 2 = Physical Harm (simpleNeuron 87, 1369–1380, Sepassault), 3 = Severe Physical Harm
(maiming, rapes), and 4 = Murder
(murder, including combined rape and
murder).
We found a significant effect of Culpa-
bility on both Punishment and Blame-
worthiness ratings (Figures 1A and 1B).
Across all participants, both Punishment
and Blameworthiness ratings were higher
for Responsibility trials compared to
Diminished Responsibility trials (Punish-
ment: F1,59 = 1,508.62, p < 0.001; Blame-
worthiness: F1,59 < 120.99, p = 0.001;
test of within-subject effects from RM-A-
NOVA; Table S1). The main effect of
Harm Severity was also significant for
both Punishment (F3,177 = 221.76, p <
0.001) and Blameworthiness (F3,179 =
22.24, p < 0.001), with higher Harm
Severity associated with higher ratingsfor both. The effect of Culpability and Harm Severity on Punish-
ment and Blameworthiness ratings remained significant when
controlling for participant gender and scenario set (see Experi-
mental Procedures; p < 0.001 for punishment ratings, p < 0.05
for blameworthiness ratings).
Greater Integration of Culpability and Harm during
Punishment
The integration-and-selection hypothesis implies that informa-
tion about Culpability and Harm interact to affect Punishment.
Supporting this notion, we found a significant Culpability-by-
Harm Severity interaction for Punishment F3,177 = 100.93. This
interaction effect appears to be driven by the steeper increase
in Punishment ratings per increase in Harm Severity for R trials
compared to DR trials (Figures 1B and 1D). We did observe a
statistically significant Culpability-by-Harm Severity interaction
for Blameworthiness ratings as well (F3,177 = 4.74, p = 0.003),
suggesting that these two factors do interact to affect Blame-
worthiness assessment (see Discussion). However, the integra-
tion-and-selection hypothesis not only implies that information
about Culpability and Harm interacts to affect norm enforce-
ment, it also predicts that this interaction will be stronger for Pun-
ishment than for Blameworthiness judgments. Consistent with
this hypothesis, the Culpability-by-Harm Severity interaction
was significantly stronger for Punishment decisions compared
to Blameworthiness judgments (Judgment Type-by-Responsi-
bility-by-Harm Severity three-way interaction: F3,177 = 22.04,tember 23, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1371
Figure 2. DLPFC Stimulation Site
DLPFC (Talairach ± 39, 37, 22 [x, y, z]) was localized for each subject by
warping individual structural MRIs to the Talairach template.
(A) Trajectory and approach angle (green funnel) calculated by Brainsight to
guide coil placement for DLPFC target coordinate (red dot). Trajectory and
target are visualized on a three-dimensional curvilinear surface reconstruction
of one individual participant’s warped T1 MRI.
(B) Location of the DLPFC target (red dot) on an individual participant’s warped
T1 image (L = R, R = L). Green crosshair indicates skull contact point for
stimulation coil.p < 0.001). Similarly, effect sizes for the Culpability-by-Harm
Severity interaction were larger for Punishment decision making
(partial h2 = 0.63) than Blameworthiness evaluation (partial h2 =
0.07). Visual inspection of the interaction plots corroborate
these statistical analyses: for Punishment, there was a markedly
steeper increase in the amount of assigned punishment per unit
increase in Harm severity, but only for trials in which the protag-
onist was fully responsible (Figure 1D). By contrast, Blamewor-
thiness judgments were better characterized by a step function,
with relatively small differences between Harm levels within R
and DR trials, accompanied by a very large difference in Blame-
worthiness ratings between R and DR trials (Figure 1C). Taken as
a whole, these results are consistent with our supposition that
integration demands are significantly higher for Punishment de-
cisions as compared to Blameworthiness judgments.
Transient Disruption of DLPFC Selectively Alters
Punishment Decisions
DLPFC function was focally and transiently disrupted with rTMS.
We applied 30 min of 1 Hz stimulation (Active group) or sham
stimulation (Sham group) to left or right hemisphere DLPFC
(see Figure 2 and Experimental Procedures). To determine the
disruptive effect of stimulation, we used a series of linear mixed
effect models. Subject was treated as a random effect and rTMS
stimulation condition, stimulation hemisphere, Culpability and
Harm Severity, and rating were modeled as fixed effect pre-
dictors. The first set of models examined the simple effect of
rTMS stimulation condition on Blameworthiness and on Pun-
ishment ratings (i.e., Blameworthiness and Punishment trials
modeled separately), after accounting for variance due to Culpa-
bility and Harm Severity. The second set of models examined
interactions between rTMS stimulation condition and stimula-
tion hemisphere on Blameworthiness and on Punishment, after
accounting for variance due to Culpability and Harm Severity.
The third set of models examined rTMS-3-Culpability and1372 Neuron 87, 1369–1380, September 23, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier IncrTMS-3-Harm Severity interactions on Blameworthiness and
on Punishment. The final model tested rTMS stimulation-3-
Judgment Type interactions. Parameter estimates were ob-
tained via restricted maximum likelihood estimation. Gender
and scenario set were included as covariates in all models. We
did not detect an effect of rTMS stimulation on response times
(see Table S1).
For Blameworthiness ratings, the main effect of rTMS condi-
tion was not significant (F1,55 = 0.031, p = 0.86), nor was the
Culpability by rTMS Condition interaction (F1,1609 = 2.57, p =
0.11). In addition, we did not observe a significant effect of Hemi-
sphere (F1,54 = 0.02, p = 0.88), and the two-way (Hemisphere by
rTMS Condition) and three-way (Hemisphere by rTMS Condition
by Culpability) interactions were also not significant (p values >
0.25) (Figure 3A).
By contrast, we found a significant main effect of rTMS Condi-
tion (F1,55 = 4.37, p = 0.04), and a significant Culpability by rTMS
Condition interaction (F1,1609 = 9.94, p = 0.002) for Punishment
decisions. We did not observe a significant main effect for
Hemisphere, nor did we observe significant two-way (Hemi-
sphere by rTMS Condition) or three-way (Hemisphere by rTMS
Condition by Culpability) interactions (all p values > 0.05).
Descriptively (Figure 3B), punishment ratings were lower in the
Active compared to the Sham rTMS Condition for Responsibility
trials (5.74 ± 0.15 versus 6.33 ± 0.15) but did not differ by rTMS
Condition for Diminished Responsibility trials (0.94 ± 0.13 versus
0.98 ± 0.15, Active versus Sham, respectively). Post hoc com-
parisons confirmed that the effect of rTMS was significant for
Responsibility trials (F1,54 = 7.78, p = 0.007), while no such effect
was observed for Diminished Responsibility trials (F1,54 = 0.05,
p = 0.83). These data indicate that DLPFC rTMS significantly
reduced punishment for culpable criminal acts and that the
magnitude of this effect did not differ as a function of which hemi-
sphere was stimulated.
Thus, supporting our hypothesis, DLPFC rTMS selectively
affected Punishment decisions about culpable agents, but not
judgments of Blameworthiness. To further test this selectivity,
we submitted the Punishment and Blameworthiness values for
each group to a formal interaction test. This analysis revealed
a significant rTMS Condition (Active versus Sham) by Judgment
Type (Punishment versus Blameworthiness) interaction (F1,3294 =
4.82, p = 0.028), such that the effect of rTMS was significantly
larger for Punishment judgments compared to Blameworthiness
judgments.
Taken together, these data confirm a causal role for DLPFC in
third-party norm enforcement that is selective for punishment
decision making, as DLPFC rTMS did not affect blameworthi-
ness judgments. Specifically, disrupting DLPFC function low-
ered the amount of punishment assigned for Responsibility sce-
narios. To further unpack this effect, we examined the effect of
rTMS onmean punishment ratings at each level of Harm Severity
separately for R and DR scenarios (Figures 3C and 3D). Consis-
tent with the analyses reported above, rTMS did not significantly
alter punishment at any level of Harm Severity for DR scenarios
(i.e., when the agent’s culpability was reduced by extenuating
circumstances; all p values > 0.3 for all harm levels; Figure 3D).
For fully culpable agents (R scenarios), we found that the effect
of rTMS was stronger for low-harm compared to high-harm.
Figure 3. TMS Selectively Affects Pun-
ishment
(A and B) Mean Blameworthiness (A) and Punish-
ment (B) Z scores as a function of TMS stimulation
condition (Active versus Sham) and Culpability
(colored error bars). Given that the ratings for R
and DR trials occupied different portions of the
scale, we z transformed the mean ratings to
emphasize the difference in rTMS effects between
each of the Punishment and Blameworthiness
conditions.
(C and D) The specific ‘‘locus’’ of the differential
effect of rTMS on Punishment and Blameworthi-
ness ratings is revealed by plotting the mean rat-
ings across all combinations of Culpability and
Harm, ordered from low Culpability/low Harm
(C) to full Culpability/high Harm (D). Error bars
indicate SEM.crimes (Property Crime: p = 0.004; Assault: p = 0.05; Maim and
Rape: p = 0.20; Murder: p = 0.47). As expected, rTMS did not
modulate blameworthiness ratings at any level of Harm Severity
for either R or DR scenarios (all p values > 0.37; Figure 3C). These
data indicate that disrupting DLPFC function lowers punishment
for culpable agents, but only when their norm violations result in
low-moderate harm.
DLPFC TMS Disrupts the Integration of Culpability and
Harm during Punishment but Not Blameworthiness
Decisions
The above results suggest that DLPFC rTMS may impair the uti-
lization of mental state information during punishment decision
making in a manner that is harm sensitive. This accords well
with our prediction that DLPFC rTMS would disrupt the joint
consideration of Culpability and Harm during punishment deci-
sion making (Buckholtz and Marois, 2012). To further unpack
the mechanisms through which DLPFC disruption affects pun-
ishment decisions, we ran a series of regression models to esti-
mate the relative influence of mental state and harm information
on punishment decisions for each subject and compared these
estimates between rTMS groups.
Punishment Models: Culpability and Harm
Across all participants and all trials, both Culpability and Harm
Severity were significant, unique predictors of punishment
amount (Model 1, Culpability: bCulpability =  0.77, p < 0.001;
Model 2, Culpability, Harm Severity: bCulpability = 0.77, p <
0.001, bHarm = 0.32, p < 0.001; Model 1 R
2 = 0.6, Model 2 R2 =
0.71, R2 change = 0.1, p < 0.001). We then calculated punish-Neuron 87, 1369–1380, Sepment-based Culpability and Harm beta-
weights (b-weights) for each subject.
Across participants, Culpability and
Harm b-weights were negatively corre-
lated (Pearson r = 0.64, p < 0.001), sug-
gesting that subjects differ in the relative
weight that they accord to culpability
and harm in their punishment decisions:
that is, for a given individual, when the
influence of culpability on punishment ishigh, the influence of harm tends to be low (and vice versa)
(Figure 4A).
Punishment Models: TMS Effects
We used a multivariate general linear model analysis to compare
participants’ bCulpability and bHarm values across rTMS groups
(hemisphere and rTMS Condition were included as fixed factors,
and sex was included as a covariate). Notably, bCulpability values
were significantly lower in the active, compared to sham rTMS
groups (F1,55 = 4.13, p = 0.047 for main effect of rTMS; p values
> 0.15 for main effect of Hemisphere and for rTMS-by-Hemi-
sphere interaction). By contrast, bHarm values were significantly
higher in participants exposed to DLPFC rTMS (F1,55 = 6.69, p =
0.01 for main effect of rTMS; p > 0.7 for main effect of hemi-
sphere and for TMS-by-hemisphere interaction) (Figure 4B).
This suggests that disrupting DLPFC function attenuates the
impact of information about offender culpability while simulta-
neously potentiating the influence of information about harm
on punishment. As an additional test of the hypothesis that
DLPFC supports the integration of culpability and harm signals,
we constructed the multiplicative interaction term bCulpability*
bHarm. This term was significantly different between rTMS
groups (p < 0.05), providing further support for the notion that
DLPFC performs an integration-and-selection function during
third-party norm-enforcement.
Punishment Models: Mediation Analyses
If DLPFC rTMS affects punishment decision making by inter-
fering with the integration of signals for culpability and harm,
thenwewould expect the impact of DLPFC rTMS on punishment
to be mediated by these signals (Figure 5). We tested thistember 23, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1373
Figure 4. Relationship between, and rTMS
Effects on, Harm and Culpability Betas for
Punishment Decisions
(A) Negative correlation between b-weights derived
from linear regression models with Harm Severity
and Culpability Level as predictors. Values shown
were obtained by z transforming the absolute value
of b-weights for each predictor. Separate regres-
sion models were created for each participant to
create per-subject b-weights.
(B) Impact of DLPFC rTMS on Harm and Culpa-
bility b-weights.hypothesis using a mediation analysis with rTMS condition as a
predictor of punishment scores in Culpability trials, bCulpability and
bHarm asmediators, and gender and scenario set as nuisance co-
variates. The total effect model was significant (F1,56 = 3.74, p =
0.02), as was the total effect of rTMS on punishment (btotal = 0.57;
0.15–0.98, 95% confidence interval [CI]). Decomposing the total
effect, we found that the direct effect of rTMS on punishment in
this model was not significant (bdirect = 0.16; 0.14–0.46, 95%
CI); however, we did observe indirect effects through the two
mediators (bCulpability = 0.17; 0.003–0.39, 95% CI; bHarm = 0.24;
0.02–0.49, 95% CI). rTMS did not affect the use of harm and
culpability information for blameworthiness decisions (see Sup-
plemental Information for b-weight and mediation analyses for
blameworthiness judgments). These data confirm our hypothe-
sis that TMS modulates punishment by affecting the way that
participants use information about culpability and harm in select-
ing appropriate third-party sanctions for norm violations.
DLPFC Activity is Selective for Punishment Decision
Making
The TMS data above indicate that transient disruption of DLPFC
function affects norm-enforcement behavior. Further, the exclu-
sive effect of DLPFC on punishment decision making (compared
to blameworthiness judgments) suggests a relatively selective
mapping between DLPFC function and one specific cognitive
component of norm-enforcement behavior, namely punishment
decision making. As a convergent test of this apparent selec-
tivity, we compared DLPFC activity with fMRI in ten participants
who were asked to make punishment and blameworthiness
judgments for the same set of scenarios used in the TMS exper-
iment. Using blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal ex-
tracted from our left and right DLPFC TMS stimulation target
sites (Figure 6A, see Experimental Procedures), we tested for
DLPFC activation differences between punishment decisions
and blameworthiness judgments. Consistent with prior work
(Buckholtz et al., 2008), we found a significant main effect of Re-
sponsibility in right DLPFC (t9 = 2.41, p = 0.04), such that the
BOLD signal in this brain region was higher during R than during
DR trials (Figure 6B). This relationship was also observed in left
DLPFC, albeit marginally (t9 = 2.12, p = 0.06). Importantly, no
such relationship was observed for blameworthiness judgments
in either the right (Figure 6B) or left DLPFC (p values > 0.4). More-1374 Neuron 87, 1369–1380, September 23, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Incover, we found a significant judgment type difference (t9 =2.23,
p = 0.05), with right DLPFC more active during punishment deci-
sions compared to blameworthiness judgments. This difference
was not observed in left DLPFC (t9 = 0.18, p = 0.86). Taken
together with the behavioral results (see Figure 1), these findings
suggest that while Punishment decisions and Blameworthiness
judgments are both sensitive to culpability differences, the use
of culpability information by DLPFC is selective for Punishment.
DISCUSSION
The principal finding of the present study is that inhibitory trans-
cranial magnetic stimulation of the DLPFC reduces the punish-
ment of culpable agents without affecting judgments of their
blameworthiness. Norm-enforcement involves assigning blame-
worthiness to a norm violator based on an evaluation of causal
responsibility and mental state, assessing the outcome of the
norm violation (i.e., the magnitude of harm) and combining these
calculations to arrive at an appropriate sanction (Buckholtz and
Marois, 2012). The current rTMS experiment confirms that as-
sessing blameworthiness and assigning punishment are cogni-
tively distinct processes, with DLPFC involvement selective for
the latter. fMRI provides convergent evidence for this selectivity,
with (right) DLPFC activity sensitive to culpability differences
during decisions about punishment but not about blameworthi-
ness. We postulate that blameworthiness judgments are a
temporally antecedent (and perhaps prerequisite) process, the
output of which (i.e., culpability estimates) is used to calibrate
the impact of harm severity on punishment magnitude selection.
Together, these data demonstrate a selective, causal role for
DLPFC in norm enforcement.
DLPFC is a cortical area that has undergone significant expan-
sion in size, specialization, and connectivity through hominoid
evolution, with striking differences evident between humans
and other apes (Sakai et al., 2011; Semendeferi et al., 2011).
While it would seem unlikely that DLPFC (or a portion thereof)
is specialized for norm-enforcement broadly, or punishment
specifically, domain-general aspects of cognition that were
enabled or enhanced by DLPFC expansion are likely necessary
to support this process. The DLPFC sends and receives projec-
tions from other multimodal association areas, motor cortex and
subcortical zones, making it well suited to coordinate a variety of.
Figure 5. DLPFC rTMS Affects Punishment
by Disrupting the Use of Harm and Culpa-
bility Signals
Mediation analysis depicts coefficients and SE
(italics) for the effect of rTMS on Harm and
Culpability b-weights (A; culpability/harm), and the
impact of these b-weights on punishment during R
trials (B). Coefficients are standardized, with sign
indicating the direction of the relationships. For
example: path (A) indicates that DLPFC rTMS
decreases the influence of harm information on
punishment, and path (B) reveals that culpability
betas are positively correlated with punishment.
Harm-related coefficients in red, culpability-
related coefficients in blue. Path (C) shows the
total effect of TMS on punishment; path (C0) shows
the direct effect of TMS on punishment (dashed
line). Point estimates of indirect effects for both
Harm and Blame signals that both fall within a 95%
confidence interval that does not cross zero, unlike
the direct effect of rTMS on punishment (see
Results).complex processes (Duncan, 2010; Mesulam, 1998; Miller and
Cohen, 2001). A key property of DLPFCmicrocircuits is their abil-
ity to maintain stable representations over time (Dehaene and
Changeux, 1995; Goldman-Rakic, 1990), underlying the role of
this region in working memory (Braver et al., 1997; Goldman-
Rakic, 1990; Nee et al., 2013). This property, in part, enables
DLPFC to coordinate among available external sensory inputs,
internal states, and response options in the service of promoting
adaptive behavior (Duncan, 2010; Fuster, 1993; Mesulam, 1998;
Miller and Cohen, 2001; Passingham and Sakai, 2004). The
massively integrative nature of information processing within
DLPFC likely explains why it appears to be fundamental to
many aspects of higher-order cognition and decision making
(Barbas and Zikopoulos, 2007; Bunge et al., 2005a; Fuster,
1993). More recent work suggests that the region of PFC that
we have targeted in the present study is specifically recruited
when adaptive performance requires that abstract representa-
tions maintained in distinct information processing streams be
synthesized and integrated into ongoing behavior (Bunge et al.,
2005b; Christoff et al., 2001; De Pisapia and Braver, 2008; De Pi-
sapia et al., 2007; Koechlin et al., 1999; Koechlin and Summer-
field, 2007; Nee et al., 2013). While many of these studies have
characterized the integrative functions subserved by DLPFC in
the context of working memory and relatively simple cognitive
tasks, we believe that this same DLPFC-dependent, domain-
general integration process also enables significantly more com-
plex forms of behavior, such as norm enforcement.
According to our integration-and-selection model (Buckholtz
and Marois, 2012), DLPFC combines information about harm
and culpability with context-specific punishment rules (e.g.,
norm-specific punishment scales and culture-specific mitigating
circumstances). The current findings offer support for this model
in several key ways. First, we show that harm and culpability
interact to determine punishment magnitude. Specifically, our
suggestion that norm-based punishment requires a synthesis
of harm and culpability signals is supported by the finding of aNeusignificant harm-by-responsibility interaction for punishment
values, as well as a significant negative correlation between
b-weights for harm and culpability predictors. Importantly,
DLPFC rTMS interferes with this synthesis. First, rTMS attenu-
ated the influence of culpability information while simultaneously
increasing the influence of harm severity signals on punishment.
Moreover, disrupting DLPFC affected the interaction between
harm and culpability signals. Finally, mediation analysis confirms
that the impact of DLPFC rTMS affects punishment by altering
the effect of harm and culpability information on punishment
magnitude. As a whole, these findings are consistent with the
notion that DLPFC supports norm enforcement by synthesizing
decision-relevant streams of information in order to bias selec-
tion from among competing response options.
Several outstanding issues merit further consideration. First,
we observed that DLPFC rTMS decreases mean punishment
scores. On its face, this is similar to Knoch and colleagues’
finding of diminished second-party punishment in the ultimatum
game following DLPFC rTMS (Knoch et al., 2006). While those
authors attribute decreased second-party punishment to an
rTMS-induced cognitive control impairment—namely, reduced
inhibition of the prepotent response to receive monetary
gains—this explanation is difficult to reconcile with the present
data. Here, one might expect reduced inhibitory control to
manifest primarily in the DR condition, when mitigating informa-
tion induces a requirement to inhibit the prepotent response to
punish those that have harmed others. However, significant
effects of rTMS on punishment are only observed for R scenarios
in the current dataset, which would not be predicted by an
inhibitory control account of DLPFC function during norm
enforcement. Nevertheless, while our study emphasizes the
disruptive effects of DLPFC rTMS on information integration
and response selection during punishment, the current data
do not rule out the involvement of other related DLPFC-depen-
dent processes (e.g., inhibitory control) in norm-enforcement
behavior (Haushofer and Fehr, 2008); indeed, it is plausible toron 87, 1369–1380, September 23, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1375
Figure 6. DLPFC Activity Selective for
Punishment
(A) Depicts 5 mm sphere around right DLPFC
stimulation target coordinate, from which task-
evoked BOLD signal was extracted for condition
comparisons.
(B) Right DLPFCBOLD percent signal change from
baseline as a function of judgment type (x axis) and
culpability (colored lines).suggest that both integration and inhibitory control operate in
tandem during norm enforcement. A more direct test of the rela-
tionship between integration-and-selection and inhibitory con-
trol during punishment awaits future work.
Second, while our findings directly implicate rDLPFC in pun-
ishment decisions, a finding that is consistent with our prior
correlational studies (Buckholtz et al., 2008; Treadway et al.,
2014), they do not speak to whether it is the only brain region
involved in this process. rTMS is, technically speaking, a focal
methodology, and our fMRI experimental design was a priori de-
signed to specifically assess the role of DLPFC in punishment
and blameworthiness judgments. Thus, it is possible that other
brain regions are differentially involved in these two judgments.
Consistent with this idea, prior work has associated mental state
inference, a key component of moral judgment and presumably
blameworthiness, with temporoparietal junction activity rather
than DLPFC activity (Decety and Cowell, 2014; Yoder and Dec-
ety, 2014; Young et al., 2007, 2010; Treadway et al., 2014). On
the whole, norm-enforcement behavior is likely facilitated by
complex functional interactions between multiple brain regions
subserving different cognitive computations (Buckholtz and
Marois, 2012; Treadway et al., 2014; Buckholtz and Meyer-Lin-
denberg, 2012; Buckholtz, 2015).
Third, DLPFC rTMS appears to reduce punishment by simul-
taneously diminishing the influence of information about culpa-
bility and enhancing the influence of information about harm
severity. At first glance, one might expect that boosting the
impact of harm signals would increase punishment. However,
the punishment-reducing effect of TMS is only observed
for low-moderate harms. For acts that result in such harms,
considering the outcome may result in lower punishment
than considering the malicious intent that produced that
outcome. In other words, reliance on harm signals would pro-
duce a lower punishment because the actual harm that
occurred is of low magnitude, while relying on culpability
assessment could result in a higher punishment because the
norm enforcer is punishing based on the agent’s intentions
(or perhaps, on the outcome that they believe the agent
desired) rather than the actual low-harm outcome. Future
modeling work on punishment decision making will help better
elucidate the precise nature of the computations that lead to
punishment and the role that specific circuits play in represent-
ing these computations.1376 Neuron 87, 1369–1380, September 23, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.Finally, we note that the mean effect of
DLPFC rTMS is relatively modest. This
may be due to the fact that we used a
group-based coordinate that we targetedon MNI-normalized brains. Functional localization of subject-
specific DLPFC foci may prove to be a more powerful approach
to stimulation-based behavioral modulation (Saxe et al., 2006).
This technique, in combination with alternative brain stimulation
methods that permit both upregulation and downregulation of
cortical function (e.g., transcranial direct current stimulation), of-
fers a particularly compelling approach to parsing the neural cir-
cuitry involved in norm-enforcement behavior (Ruff et al., 2013).
Using non-invasive cortical stimulation and fMRI, we outline
here a domain-general, DLPFC-dependent cognitive mecha-
nism—integration-and-selection—underlying third-party pun-
ishment decisions for social norm violations (crimes). The current
data suggest a possible neuroanatomical parsing of norm en-
forcement, with DLPFC function selectively mapping to one
component of this construct (assigning deserved punishment)
but not another (assessingmoral responsibility). The dissociation
between punishment and blameworthiness observed here ac-
cords well with previous studies on the second-party pun-
ishment of distributional (fairness) norms, in which DLPFC
disruption appeared to selectively affect the punishment of
intentional norm violations (Knoch et al., 2006; Sanfey et al.,
2003) while leaving intact an evaluation of the fairness of an
agent’s behavior and the presence of a norm violation (see
also Ruff et al., 2013 for a similar dissociation for norm compli-
ance). The fact that rTMS did not disrupt blameworthiness judg-
ments in the present experiment is all the more remarkable given
that this judgment utilized a response scale that was identical to
the one used for the punishment decision, differing only in the
type of decision (degree of moral responsibility for an act versus
appropriate punishment for that act). This finding in turn sug-
gests that high-level evaluative and reasoning processes that
are crucial for norm-enforcement (assessment of moral respon-
sibility) may take place with minimal involvement of the DLPFC
(at least the DLPFC area targeted in the present study). Indeed,
it may be that the DLPFC supports norm enforcement not by
instantiating any one particular cognitive process, but rather by
integrating the outputs of a variety of norm-relevant cognitive
processes.
The current study provides a suggestive window into the
cognitive mechanisms that underlie paradigmatic decisions in
the criminal justice system.Modern institutions of justice depend
on the ability of disinterested third-parties—typically jurors and
judges—to integrate information about the actions and mental
states of others in order to decide whether to punish and, if so,
how much (Bendor and Swistak, 2001; Boyd et al., 2010; Crock-
ett et al., 2014; Henrich et al., 2006; Marlowe et al., 2011). Thou-
sands of jurors and judgesweigh the fates of criminal defendants
every day, a process that enables the large-scale cooperation
and widespread peace that we all enjoy. However, this process
is no less remarkable for being so commonplace. While Homo
sapiens is not the only primate species to punish in retaliation
for direct harms (second-party punishment) (Jensen et al.,
2007a, 2007b; Proctor et al., 2013), humans alone among all an-
imals appear willing to bear personal costs in order to sanction
those who have harmed others (Riedl et al., 2012). The adoption
of this norm enforcement strategy by our species is thought to
have played a crucial role in the evolutionary stability of human
cooperation (Bendor and Swistak, 2001). This study nominates
DLPFC, a region that is uniquely suited for representational inte-
gration, as a core neural substrate for this capacity.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
rTMS Study
Participants
Sixty-six healthy volunteers (aged 18–30; 32 males) were recruited from the
Vanderbilt University community through the Department of Psychology’s
Study Pool website. All participants provided written informed consent, and
all study procedures were approved by the Vanderbilt University Institutional
Review Board (See Supplemental Information for exclusionary criteria).
Six subjects were excluded from analyses due to data quality issues, head
movement greater than 5 mm away from DLPFC target during the rTMS ses-
sion (for >5 min, cumulatively), leaving 60 subjects for further analysis.
Study Design
In our primary experiment, we employed a 2 3 2 between-groups design,
with rTMS condition (active versus sham) and hemisphere (left versus right
DLPFC) as between-subject factors. The 66 participants were randomly as-
signed into the four groups. After exclusion of the 6 subjects with excessive
head movement, that left 14 and 16 subjects in active left and right condi-
tions (respectively), and 13 and 17 subjects in the sham left and right condi-
tions (respectively). Following a screening visit and a structural MRI scan (for
active condition participants; see below), all subjects participated in two
separate rTMS sessions. We employed a two-session approach owing to
the temporal dynamics of 1 Hz rTMS stimulation. Low-frequency rTMS
has been shown to suppress cortical excitability of the targeted region
following stimulation (Robertson et al., 2003), with cognitive and behavioral
effects lasting for approximately half the time of stimulation duration (San-
drini et al., 2011; Thut and Pascual-Leone, 2010). The maximum stimulation
duration in any one session was approximately 30 min, constraining each of
the two rating sessions to 15 min. Participants evaluated blameworthiness in
one session and assigned punishment in the other. Task order (punishment
versus blameworthiness) was counterbalanced across participants. Partici-
pants received the same type of stimulation, to the same hemisphere, in
both sessions. The two sessions were separated by no less than 48 hr
and no more than 2 weeks.
MRI
For participants recruited into an active condition of the study, we obtained a
structural MRI to aid anatomical localization of the DLPFC ROI for rTMS (see
Supplemental Experimental Procedures for MR sequence details).
rTMS Sessions
At the start of each experimental session, subjects completed the Mini-Mental
Status Exam and the TMS/rTMS Acute Side Effects questionnaire (see Sup-
plemental Experimental Procedures) to obtain baseline measurements for
comparison with post-scan ratings. The experimenter explained the task in-
structions to participants, who completed five practice trials for the session-
appropriate judgment type (i.e., blameworthiness versus punishment). The
practice scenarios spanned the full extent of crime severity and responsibilityNeuof the scenarios used in the experimental session in order for subjects to cali-
brate their ratings along the entire 10-point Likert scale.
rTMS stimulation was then applied for 30 min to left or right DLPFC using a
Magstim 2T Rapid stimulator (30% of maximum output), and either MagStim
placebo coil (Sham condition) or a MagStim 70-mm air-cooled figure-8 coil
(Active condition). rTMS pulses were triggered remotely using a computer.
Sham stimulation produced a click that resembled the sound of rTMS; how-
ever, no magnetic pulse was delivered. For participants in the active condition
of the study, DLPFC was localized for manual targeting using the Brainsight
frameless stereotaxic system (Rogue Research), which was calibrated prior
to each session. Participants’ structural MRIs were warped to a common co-
ordinate space, and the DLPFC target set on each subject’s Talairach-warped
brain surface. Talairach coordinates were ±39, 37, 22 [x,y,z], corresponding to
left or right Brodmann area 46. This coordinate was chosen because it was the
focus of peak activation for the DLPFC region engaged by punishment deci-
sions in our prior study (Buckholtz et al., 2008) (see Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures for additional details on target localization). Immediately
following stimulation, participants were asked to perform the rating task (i.e.,
punishment or blameworthiness assessment) on a computer that was directly
adjacent to the rTMS apparatus. After participants completed the task, we
again administered the TMS/rTMS Acute Side Effects questionnaire and
Mini-mental status exam to monitor for any adverse effects of rTMS.
Experimental Paradigm
The scenarios used in the present study were the same as in Buckholtz et al.
(2008). On each trial of the task, subjects were shown a short written scenario
depicting the actions of a protagonist named ‘‘John.’’ These scenarios were
divided into two conditions: Responsibility and Diminished Responsibility. In
the Responsibility condition (R), John was described committing a crime,
ranging from simple theft to assault and murder. In the Diminished-Responsi-
bility (DR) condition, John was described committing crimes of similar magni-
tude, but these scenarios also contained mitigating, justifying, or otherwise
excusing circumstances that reduced John’s level of criminal culpability (see
Supplemental Experimental Procedures for additional scenario details).
In each session, subjects were asked to make ratings on 28 such scenarios
(14 R, 14 DR). During the ‘‘punishment’’ session, subjects were asked to
‘‘Please indicate how much punishment John deserves for his actions
described in the scenario, on a Likert scale from 0–9, where 0 = No Punishment
and 9 =ExtremePunishment.’’ During the ‘‘blameworthiness’’ session, subjects
were asked to ‘‘Please indicate how morally responsible John is for his actions
described in the scenario, on a scale from 0–9, where 0 = Not Morally Respon-
sible At All and 9 = Completely Morally Responsible.’’ Participants were asked
to consider each scenario (and thus, each ‘‘John’’) independently of the others
and were encouraged to use the full scale (0–9) for their ratings. In the scanner
but prior to the functional scans, subjects were shown five practice scenarios
that were designed to span the punishment scale. The rating tasks were self-
paced, with each scenario presented until the participants made a response,
or until a maximum of 40 s. Participants were instructed to make a response
as soon as they had reached a decision. Total maximumpossible session dura-
tion was 21 min; however, average session duration was 14 min.
Mediation Analysis
Weused conditional process analyses to test the hypothesis that DLPFC rTMS
affects punishment ratings by modulating the influence of culpability and
harm on punishment decisions (Hayes, 2013). These analyses were performed
using the SPSS macro ‘‘PROCESS,’’ made available by Andrew Hayes
(Hayes, 2013). We constructed a conditional process model that specified
rTMS group (Active or Sham) as an independent variable, bCulpability and bHarm
values as mediators, and punishment values as a dependent variable. Punish-
ment set and gender were included as covariates. We used a non-parametric
resampling procedure (bootstrapping) with 5,000 samples to estimate the sig-
nificance of the indirect effect. Through bootstrapping, we calculated point
estimates of the indirect effects for each mediator over all samples and con-
structed a 95% confidence interval around each point estimate. Statistical sig-
nificance is inferred if the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval do
not contain zero. Bootstrapping is generally considered preferable to para-
metric tests of mediation (e.g., the Sobel test), because it avoids the assump-
tion of normality for the sampling distributions of the total and specific indirect
effects, which is typically violated in practice.ron 87, 1369–1380, September 23, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1377
fMRI Study
Participants
Ten healthy community volunteers were recruited to participate in this study
(aged 18–36; 7 males). All participants provided written informed consent,
and all procedures were approved by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Re-
view Board (IRB). Exclusionary criteria were identical to those used in the rTMS
portion of this study, described above.
Experimental Stimuli
Stimuli and ratings were the same as those used in the rTMS experiment,
described above, with the exception that in addition to rating punishment
and blameworthiness, participants also rated how long it took John to
plan and execute the actions described in the scenario. Results from this
rating will not be described here, as these data were collected as part of
a separate experiment. Participants saw 84 of these vignettes, split evenly
between the R and DR conditions and between the different judgment
types. Importantly, the number of R and DR conditions was identical across
the judgment types, and the order of judgment type was counterbalanced
across subjects.
Experimental Protocol
Subjects were asked to make 1 of the 3 ratings described above while under-
going an fMRI scan. Participants completed 12 runs, with each rating
completed in a block of 4 sequential runs. At the beginning of each block,
before the scanner started, subjects completed 5 practice trials to familiarize
them with the rating for that block. Each run consisted of 7 trials split between
the R and DR conditions, with a minimum of 1 trial of each type presented in
each run. Scenarios were presented during scanning and during practice using
a visual display presented on an LCD panel and back-projected onto a screen
positioned at the front of the magnet bore. Subjects were positioned supine in
the scanner so as to be able to view the projector display using a mirror above
their eyes. Manual responses were recorded using two five-button keypads
(one for each hand; Rowland Institute of Science). Subjects were instructed
to make a manual response as soon as they had arrived at a decision, so as
to ensure that neural activity around the time of response would reflect deci-
sion making. After each manual-press, subjects viewed a fixation cue for a
12 s inter-trial interval (ITI). Subjects had up to 45 s to respond on each trial.
If this limit was reached without a response, the trial automatically moved
into the ITI.
fMRI Statistical Analysis
A random-effects general linear model (GLM) was constructed by convolving a
canonical hemodynamic response function (double gamma, including a posi-
tive g function and a smaller, negative g function to reflect the BOLD under-
shoot) to the following set of regressors: a ‘‘decision’’ epoch starting at the
time point 3 TRs (6 s) prior to each response and ending with the TR in which
the response wasmade, and a baseline that included all other epochs. The se-
lection of the decision epoch was motivated by the expectation that decision-
related modulation of BOLD signal would correspond with the portion of the
time course prior to and up to the participants’ responses (Cushman et al.,
2012; Shenhav and Greene, 2010). b-weights for each fMRI run were trans-
formed into Z scores signifying the magnitude of deviation of fMRI signal
during the decision epoch as compared to the average signal during all other
periods. Detail on fMRI acquisition parameters and preprocessing are
included in Supplemental Information.
A Priori ROI Definition
We examined time course data from our two a priori DLPFC ROIs. Both ROIs
were defined by a 5 mm cube centered on the peak coordinate also targeted
by rTMS, identified in our previous study (Buckholtz et al., 2008). Time courses
of activation were created for each condition (R and DR) for each judgment
type (Punishment and Responsibility) for each subject by collapsing across
epochs for each cell of this 2 3 2 design for each subject. Time courses
were compared to a baseline of the overall average for that condition for
that rating.SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
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